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INTRODUCTION 
Civil disobedience has long been a topic of 
concern in the field of ethics. It has been justified 
and discredited by various opposing ethical theories. 
My purpose is to analyze the ways civil disobedience has 
been justified for individuals and apply these 
justifications to groups as moral agents. In doing so 
I hope to come to an understanding of the most effec-
tive reasons for justifying civil disobedience for 
groups and for individuals. 
My concern in the second chapter is to describe 
civil disobedience according to the most commonly held 
definitions and to lay the groundwork for the discussion 
of justification. I will do this through defining civil 
disobedience and explaining the justification of 
civil disobedience and apply these concepts to the group. 
In the third chapter I will analyze the three 
major theories used to bulwark the justification of 
civil disobedience and apply these to both groups and 
individuals. The reasons people give for their 
disobedience is usually that they are acting according 
to their consciences, or according to a higher law, 
or for the greater happiness of society. While these 
theories usually are applied to individuals I will apply 
1 
them to group~ as well, 
In the fourth chapter.I will establish additional 
conditions by which an act of civil disobedience can 
be judged morally justifiable. These conditions are 
.. 
nonviolence in the form of the disobedience and 
acceptance of suffering by the morally sincere dis-
obedient agent. 
In Chapter V I show that the conditions and 
reasons for justification are applied differently to 
groups than to individuals, but that groups are still 
morally justified according to their nature and purposes. 
I conclude with my own formulation of justifiable 
civil disobedience which is that civil disobedience 
is morally justified for groups and individuals in 
most cases provided that the disobedience is preceded 
by a truthful investigation of the situation, an 
attempt is made at solving the problem through 
legal means (if feasible), and it is conducted non-
violently with the good of the opponent and entire 
community in mind. The individual di.sobedient should 
be willing to accept suffering as part of the process, 
Finally, while individual civil disobedience is praise-
worthy if morally justified, group civil disobedience 
is often more effective and is equally justifiable. 
2 
CHAPTER I 
MORAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS IN GROUP AND INDIVIDUAL 
CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 
Trad~tionally civil disobedience has been considered 
morally justifable for individuals in specific situations. 
Civil disobedience is usually associated with the names of 
great individualists such as Thoreau, Tolstoy, and Gandhi. 
Yet most acts of civil disobedience have been planned, 
organized and carried out by groups. It is my project to 
discover a means to justify civil disobedience for groups 
as well as for individuals. To proceed it is helpful to 
define civil disobedience and explain its justification. 
Prior to investigating the most common theories used for 
justifying civil disobedience we will discuss the possibility 
of the justification of group civil disobedience, 
Civil disobedience defined 
The first step in coming to a greater understanding 
of how civil disobedience is justified for groups and 
individuals is to arrive at a common definition of civil 
disobedience, Civil disobedience is the conscious violation 
of a law or custom of society by a group or individual in 
order to achieve some good or eliminate some evil within 
society. It is usually a public action by which the group 
3 
or 1nd~v~ctua1 c~lls public attention to a specific 
injust~ce for the purpose of changing the law. Normally 
4 
the act of civil disobedience is nonviolent, and the agent 
is will1ng to submit to punishment. Finally~ self-
interest is no.t the primary motive for disobeying the law.l 
Different aspects of the definition of civil 
disobedience are disputed, as are the reasons given for 
the justification of civil disobedience, Prior to any 
attempt to unravel the ways civil disobedience is justified 
for groups and individuals some of the disputed points 
need clarification since they relate directly to the 
questions of justification. It should be kept in mind 
that civil disobedience is a practical tactic used by 
groups or individuals to change the law or to demonstrate 
a particular moral position. 2 
Firstly~ civil disobedience is a conscious act. 
It is freely chosen by the group or the individual. The 
persons involved know they are violating the law and do so 
with purposeful intent. 
Secondly~ the act is either illegal or it violates 
a deeply-rooted social custom which has the force of a 
law. Much dispute has been made over whether or not an 
lw. T, Blackstone, 11 Civil Disobedience: Is it .Justified?" 
Southern Journal of Philsophy, Summer and Fall (1970),233. 
2Blackstone, p.233. 
act l~ illegal if it is justified by a higher court at a 
later point in time. Whether or not the purpose of the 
disobedience is to test the Constitutionality of a law or 
custom, at the moment of action the given law or custom 
must be actually violated) 
It can be argued that civil disobedience means 
only the violation of positive law. 4 Yet, customs which 
are so powerful as to have nearly the force of law are 
5 
included because of the powerful effect they have on society 
and because of the impact disobedience to such a custom 
may have on society. For example, some segregationist 
policies of the South in the 1950's and 1960's were not 
always backed up by legal statutes, nonetheless they 
were so strongly engrained in the customs of the people 
that to violate them would mean challenging the entire 
Southern society. 
ThirdlyJ the act of civil disobedience is 
usually public for it is often an appeal to the public for 
support and sympathy or for recognition of some grave 
injustice. However, not all civil disobedience need 
3Blackstone, p. 236 . 
4Michae1 Bay1es 2 "The Justifiability of Civil Disobedience" 
Review of Metaphysics, 24 (1970), 5. 
be public.5 In a totalitarian regime the value of achiev-
ing public sympathy or attention may be outweighed by 
other values, such as keeping a secret coalition active. 
Fourthly, civil disobedience is usually carried 
out selectively; it seeks to reform a specific situation 
of perceived injustice rather than challenge the entire 
system.6 There is much dispute regarding this point, 
especially in light of the Gandhian civil disobedience 
campaign in India which was put in effect to f::ree that 
country from colonial rule by the British. Thus, civil 
disobedience has been used to overthrow an entire system. 
6 
Fifthly, civil disobedience is usually character-
ized by nonviolence.7 There is some dispute regarding this 
point because of the coercive element which can be present 
in civil disobedience. However, nonviolent civil dis-
obedience is usually easier to justify and often more 
effective in gaining popular support than violent dis-
obedience. Suffice it to say that most civil disobedience 
is nonviolent. A closer look at the reasons behind its 
nonviolent character will be conducted in the fourth chapter. 
5Leslie MacFarlane, "Justifying Political Disobedience" 
Ethics 79 (1968), 46. 
6 Bayles, p. 4. 
7Blackstone, p. 233. 
7 
Finally, the purpose can be either (a) to maintain 
personal moral integrity or (b) to change the laws or 
the customs of soc1ety. 8 The maintenance of personal moral 
integrity is usually present in cases of draft resistance 
or non-compliance with rules which violate a person's 
conscience or religion. 
The purpose of changing the laws of society can 
arise from any number of motives and reasons. But the 
good intended by the agent is the good of the whole society 
as well as the good of the minority, Because civil dis-
obedience is assumed to be directed to the common good, 
the agent does not act out of self gain primarily. One 
problem with this is that the desire to accomplish the 
goal is a personal desire. Thus, there seems to be 
self-interest in achieving even an altruistic goal, 
We shall take up the question of selfishness and self-
interest again in our discussion of self-suffering as 
a criterien for morally justifiable civil disobedience, 
8Bayles,. p.6. 
Justification of Civil Disobedience Explained 
H&ing defined civil disobedience the next step 
is to discover what one means by a justification of civil 
disobedience. Generally, to say that a person's act is 
justified means (that) the person has a right to perform 
that act, A distinction can be made bet~een a person being 
right and a person having a right. A person may be in 
the right when he does a certain action, but he may not 
have a right to do the action. 9 Or a person may have 
a right to a certain action, but he may be wrong in doing 
it. Ou:-' concern is with finding reasons for an agent who 
claims a right to disobedience. And following this what 
are the criteria, or standards, by which we can judge 
an act of civil disobedience to be justified or not? 
The issue of rights also involves duties. There 
is little agreement regarding the extent rights involve 
duties. Generally, if one has a right to something, 
others have a duty not to prohibit the action of the agent. 
9John Rawls, !!The Justification of Civil Disobedience" in 
Civil Disobedience: Theory and Practice, Ed. Hugo Bedau, 
p.254. 
8 
9 
J~sti.fie.b;il;ity and Rights 
Hichael Bayles in nThe Justifiability of Civil 
Disobt=!diencell ~eeks to distinguish the concept of a 
right from justifiability, He recognizes that there cannot 
be a legal system which dispenses rights to disotey the 
law, for this would be self-contradictory. But one 
has a. rie;ht to c'tvil disobedience 11 in the sense that one 
has a legal right to what the law does ~ot forbid and 
civil disobedience itself is not an illegal action in 
addition to the illegal action involved .... nlQ This 
fact is recognized by most other writers on the subject. 
Thus a moral right rather than a legal right is most often 
claimed in cases of civil disobedience. 
But Bayles goes on to distinguish three types 
of judgements regarding rights: l) those of rightness or 
wrongness of specific actions or types of action (justifi-
ability), 2) those concerning the character of man, and 3) 
those concerning what moral principles a society ought 
to adopt when there are a diversity of personal moral 
principles extant. Bayles puts the right of civil 
disobedience in thl,s third category. For "to recognize 
a r~ght to civil disobed;ience is to claim such conduct 
lOBayles, p. 8. 
11 8 Bayles, p. , 
is alwaya at least prima facie right (justifable) and one 
has a prima facie duty to permit it. 11 Bayles would want 
to deny that there is a prima facie right to civil dis-
obedience. 
People are persuaded to this moral principle of 
prima facie right by the sincerity of the civilly dis-
obedient agent. But Bayles argues that the character of 
10 
the person or group should be kept separate from the action; 
it cannot be allowed to outweigh all other considerations. 
While the reeling of moral compulsion on the part of the 
disobedient may be enough to allow for the justifiability 
of the disobedience 2 it is not enough to allow for his 
right to be civilly disobedient. 
Bayles claims that there is a prima facie obligation 
to obey the laws, and the disobedient must show a prima 
facie obligation not to obey the laws in order for his 
act of disobedience to be justifiable. 
There are several problems with Bayles' position 
regarding the justification of civil disobedience. Some 
clarifications would be helpful. What Bayles terms 
"justifiability;' or moral correctness is equivalent to what 
Rawls would call "being in the right." What Bayles terms 
a "right to civil disobedience (which he denies) Rawls 
calls "having a right 11 , There is a conceptual difference 
b.etwe~n being justified and. having a righ.t .12 Bayles 
clarifies the difference by stating that from the agent's 
perspective he is morally justified if he acts as he 
feels morally obligated to act~ but from the observer's 
perspective that makes no difference. The right to commit 
civil disobedience must come from the interaction of the 
agent with the rest of society. To claim a right to 
civil disobedience is to claim that others have a duty 
to allow the agent to commit the act. Nonetheless it is 
justifiable to violate an immoral law (and even a moral 
law provided one is unable to violate the immoral law~ 
but would have been justified in doing so.) 
Given a moral system based on the primacy of 
individual rights~ it might be possible to claim a prima 
facie right to civil disobedience. The same might hold 
for disobedience in totalitarian regimes. But a prima 
facie right to civil disobedience need not be claimed by 
the agent; in fact the process of discerning whether to 
disobey or not usually involves a deliberate weighing of 
11 
conflicting duties to the law and to a higher moral principle. 
The end result may be that a person or a group has a right 
12
rn Bayles' distinction between justifiability and. right 
to civil disobedience, he notes that "an instance or 
type of d.isobed.ient action may be judged right (justifable} 
without recognizing a right to civil disobedience.'' (p.S) 
The distinction seems to be more between the particular 
instance vs. civil disobedience in general. 
to d1sobey, i.e,, they have a justified claim, but 
also have a stronger duty to obey. 
12 
Rights vs. Duties 
At first glance it seems that in a denocracy 
a person has a duty to obey the law even if it offends 
his moral rights. This would hold for groups as moral 
agents or as legal entities in society as well as for 
individuals. While Bayles places an emphasis on the 
lack of moral right to disobey the law in general, Ronald 
Dworkin in Taking Rights Seriouslyl3 turns this around 
and puts the emphasis on a general moral duty to obey 
all the laws in a democracy as a duty to fellow citizens. 
13 
Yet this duty to fellow citizens is not an absolute 
duty, "because even a society that is in princ-iple just 
may produce unjust laws and policies, and a man has duties 
other than his duties to the state." Two of these duties 
are to God and to conscience, "and if these conflict with 
his duty to the State, then he is entitled, in the end 
to do what he judges to be right." But then, "he must 
submit to the judgment and punishment that the State 
imposes in recognition of the fact that his duty to his 
fellow citizens was overwhelmed but not extinguished by 
his religious or moral obligations." Thus it is seen 
that for Dworkin t~person in society has a duty to obey 
the law in general, but has a right to follow his conscience 
when it conflicts with that duty. Moreover, it is wicked 
13Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, Cambridge: 
University Press (1977), p. 185. 
for the State to punish and, forbid what it acknowledges 
its citizens have a right to, i.e., following their 
. 14 
consc1.ences. 
Blackstone, like DwDrkin, finds the civil dis-
obedient balancing the claims the State places on him 
with those of a different authority. "But the civil 
disobedient acknowledges the law and its claim to his 
obedience and respects the rights of others.rrl5 But 
the disobedient decides to override this claim on the 
14 
basis of what he considers to be a higher moral obligation. 
Thus, justification for civil disobedience from the per-
spective of the disobedient depends on the more weighty 
duty, rather than a simple sense of the rightness or wrong-
ness of a situation. The individual needs a normative 
ethical theory to justify his actions. For Blackstone the 
conclusion one makes on whether one is justified or not 
depends upon the ethics one adopts. The justification 
itself is established in the difficult process of balancing 
conflicting moral claims. 
Leslie MacFarlane is much more precise in analyzing 
the nature of justification in reference to civil disobedience. 
l4o~orkin~ pp. 186-187. 
l5Blackstone, p.233. 
15 
Firstly, justification is concerned with explain-
ing human behavior. It is usually rational, is substantial 
in form and open to objection because the conclusions 
drawn are never logocally required from the premises. 
Justification is usually personal, requiring only sufficient 
and adequate reasons, and does not seek to convert others 
but to show that the reasons are sufficient for the agent. 
MacFarlane emphasizes the nature of the motives and the 
strength ot conviction ot the agents more than logical or 
factual strength of the argument. In contrast to Bayles' 
position, moral sincerity has more weight in deciding 
whether the agent is justified or not.l6 
Justification for an action in the political realm 
requires that the act be not merely non-harmful but "it 
must always result in some demonstrable expected public 
good. 11 Moreover, the justification depends on the positions 
from which the judgment is made and on the underlying 
assumptions on which it is based.l7 
MacFarlane also recognizes the prima facie obligat-
ion to obey the rules of society, since people need 
society and society needs rules. And since civil 
16 MacFarlane, pp. 25-27. 
17 
MacFarlane, pp. 28, 30. 
16 
disobedience is an act of "direct defiance of the authority 
of the state,rr it needs to be justified, Yet on the other 
hand, "all political regimes need to justify their actions, 
for all political actions requires justification."1 8 
A conditional ground for justifiable civil disobedience 
is the failure of the system to justify its actions. One 
has a duty to obey the rules of society enforced by the 
political structure, but if the rules or enforcement of 
the rules cannot be justified, then there is a strong 
likelihood that disobedience of the rules may be 
justified, 
A right to perform a particular act of civil 
disobedience cannot be denied out of hand without a look 
at the purposes of the disobedients. What the disobedient 
seeks to establish is sufficient justification for a 
particular act of disobedience, not justification for 
total rejection of obligation to the State. 19 Yet, the 
disobedient should recognize the possibility of a positive 
duty to disobey rather than mere permissibility to disobey. 
When the more general problem of the balance 
between the individual's and society's rights presents 
itself as a dilemma through a concrete act of disobedience, 
l8MacF~rlane, p. 3~ 
19
rviacFarlane, P, 33. 
17 
the individual faces the question of finding which norm is 
sufficient or necessary to justify the act of disobedience, 
to outweigh any conflicting norm. Finally, what the 
ultimate purpose is, the root value for which the action 
is done, is a question which the disobedient must answer 
for himself. The justification of disobedience depends 
on the nature of the act, the specific situation, and 
possibly the consequence of the act~ as well as upon the 
intentions of the agent and the norm by which the agent 
judges to act. 
To summarize, we have looked at justification and 
rights and duties from the perspective of the individual 
disobedient. For the State to accept civil disobedience 
as justifiable it must recognize the validity of higher 
moral principles and the right of the individual conscience 
to disobey a law it considers immoral. Generally it seems 
that all justifiable civil disobedience is justified by 
universally acceptable moral principles. 
We have seen that while Bayles makes a distinction 
between the right to disobey and the justifiability of 
disobedience, MacFarlane treats the general theory of 
justification more broadly but claims that in certain 
cases there is not only a right to disobey out an obli-
gation to disobey. A basic distinction made in arguments 
regarding civil disobedience is that between legal and 
moral rights; most disooedients would claim a moral right 
to disobey, There is dlsagreement on whether a person 
18 
is justified because he perceives the acceptance of legal 
punishment as one of his legal options rather than obeying a 
particular law. Finally, a distinction can be made between 
personal civil disobedience, which is considered a matter 
of conscience, and social civil disobedience, which is 
based on concern for a minority or for society as a whole. 
For example, an individual may refuse to register for the 
draft because his religious beliefs and code prohibit his 
placing himself in a position to kill. Another may violate 
the same law with the purpose of protesting the dis-
crimination of an all-male conscription. As the intentions 
of the agents differ, so will their justifications differ, 
Realizing that there are still problems in establish-
ing what constitutes morally justifiable disobedience for 
the individual, nonetheless we have seen that civil dis-
obedience can be justified for individuals given adequate 
moral reasons, But, can justification theories apply to 
group civil disobedience as well? Prior to investigating 
the three major theories used to justify disobedience 
it would be helpful to investigate the possibility of 
justifying group civil disobedience, 
Group~ and Justification 
While literature on civil disobedience includes 
group actions, the emphasis is most strongly given to 
the role of the individual conscience versus society. In 
ti<esense that it is ~nd1vidually that members of a civil 
disobedient group are legally brought to trial and that 
each person must make his or her own decision, this 
emphasis is understandable, Yet in terms of social 
civil disobedience (vs. per~onal civil disobedience) the 
role of the group is generally more evident than that of 
the individual. 
Historically it is the group which is often 
credited with presenting powerful dissent in society, 
For example, the fame of Mahatma Gandhi is due primarily 
to the fact that he organized civil disobedients on a 
mass scale, The effectiveness of Martin Luther King, Jr, 
19 
was revealed not so much in what he said but in the thousands 
that rallied and protested and carried on the mass civil 
disobedience campaigns for civil rights, 
In most actions of social civil disobedience~ 
i.e,, those carried out to make some positive change 
in the laws or customs of society, it is the disobedient 
group which decides as a group what action to take, when, 
where, how, and for what purpose. For a group to accept the 
decision of one person without sufficient individual 
reflection and input~ as in the case of blind obedience, 
either indicates a great trust and knowledge of the 
leader or the possibility of coercion coupled with a 
lack of will in the group, This latter possibility 
in itself might indicate that the purpose and means of 
the act might not be wholly consistent with what the 
group as a whole desires. For example, if the end were 
a more democratic voting process for society, but the 
group as a whole were coerced or pressured into an 
illegal action by one of its members, then the process 
would be considered suspect. 
The predominance of the philosophical support 
for the justification of civil disobedience is based on 
20 
the right of the individual conscience. At the same time, 
the predominance of the opposition is based on the rejection 
of the tyranny of the individual conscience over the 
established order of society, To resolve this dispute 
three steps can be taken, Firstly, the traditional accept-
ance of the social nature of the individual can be 
clarified and enchanced~ for in so far as he is communal 
to that extent is he responsible for society and can be 
given the right to oppose all that is harmful to society. 
But that whlch ;is harmful to society may be present in 
society through its laws and customs, Thus the individual 
through his communal nature and because of his social con-
21 
cern may seek to preserve the social good through opposing 
specific laws, 
Secondly, to avoid the hazard of the particularized 
consciousness, i.e,, the moral conscience which perceives 
its rights and duties only in the light of personal de-
sires, one might posit a communal consciousness, This 
communal consciousness is not merely unconscious but can 
be made explicit. Through this a person develops an 
awareness of others and of the needs of others,20 
Actions done by the individual for the good of the commun-
ity are grounded in this awareness; thus it can provide 
at least partial justification for the actions of an 
individual, i.e., those actions done for the good of 
society, Although the individual with such a consciousness 
may be blamed for limited vision, one who acts from this 
communal consciousness cannot be accused of pure self-
interest, 
Thirdly, the tyranny of the individual conscience 
in civil disobedience may be overturned by turning to the 
group as the locus of civil disobedience. Even if the 
individual is social by nature and has a consciousness 
and moral concern for the good of society he may not be 
20contemporary psychological theories support the view 
that there is growth in the moral consciousness of 
individuals, The individual grows in awareness of the 
needs of larger society and tries to find ways of 
meeting that need. 
the most effective agent for soc~al change, Also~ 
although an individual may feel his disobedient act is 
morally j~stifiable, it may not be objectively justified 
given Bayles' distinction between the agent and the 
observer. For the t~me being let us leave the first two 
steps and elaborate on this third step of moving to 
group disobedience. 
If a group is justified in civil disobedience, 
then it is seen as having rights and duties. For our 
purposes we will assume that a group can be considered 
a moral agent; a closer critique will come in Chapter V, 
If the group can be considered a moral agent, then it 
would seem that civil disobedience is justified for the 
group in the same way as it is for the individual moral 
agent. 
Prior to assuming s~ch a similarity in the 
justification for an individual and for a group, ~t would 
be good to take into account what is meant by a group. 
22 
A group is more than a mere aggregate of individuals; it 
is at least a collection of individuals with a common 
purpose, governed by some common rules. Whenever group is 
mentioned here in the context of civil disobedience any-
thing from a few people to a national organization is 
included, from formal legal corporations to informal 
block clubs, any organized subgroup w~thin society, This 
23 
will be narrowed later~ 
There are certain advantages and disadvantages 
to judging as a unit a conglomeration of individuals with 
common rules and purposes. The disadvantages are: (a) 
individuals within the group may disagree with a given 
decision and yet be forced to accede, (b) the purposes of 
the individuals may be drastically different from the 
expressed purpose of the group as a whole, (c) the leader 
may dominate the group and force his decisions on the whole; 
thus, personal responsibility, obligation, right, and 
culpability may undergo changes or be compromised by the 
' 
d . . d t. 21 group s eclslon an ac lon. Furthermore, society as 
a while may be more willing to recognize the justification 
of the individual conscience rather than that of the group. 
The advantages are that a group avoids the arguments 
that the individual faces, e.g., ineffectiveness because 
of being one against many, lack of moral weight. The group 
can also share a wealth of knowledge, expertise, social 
connections, and communal spirit, wh.ich the individual 
alone cannot possible do. We shall investigate more 
thoroughly in Chapter v. the differences between group and 
individual civil disobedience. But first I would like to 
establish six possible ways in which group civil disobedience 
21MacFarlane, pp. 34-35 
24 
might be justified. 
There are several ways in which civil disobedience 
can be justified for the group, some of which overlap 
the ways in which the individual is justified. First, if 
the group is considered as a collection of individuals, 
civil disobedience might be justified for the whole in 
so far as it is justified for each individual, Second, 
it might be justified according to the nature of the actions 
of the group,22 Third, it might be justified according 
to the purpose of the group. Fourth, it might be justified 
according to the role the group plays in society, e.g., 
it might be more difficult to justify civil disobedience 
as enacted by the Senate than by the NAACP. Fifth, if the 
group is considered a moral agent civil disobedience is 
justified in ~actly the same way as it is for individuals 
(at least analogously). Finally, group civil disobedience 
might be justified according to the nature of the group 
as the matrix between the individual and larger society. 
The group includes the sphere of operations in which the 
individual can become most social, i.e., aware of society 1 s 
needs, and by which society becomes personalized. Society 
becomes concretized in the specific social relations of 
the members within the group and of the group with other 
groups and individuals. 
22 
MacFarlane, p. 30~ 
Having investigated the possibility of justi-
fication of group civil disobedience through discussing 
the nature of the group, the reasons for moving to the 
group as a locus of disobedience, and six possible ways 
of justifying the group, we can proceed to those theories 
by which individuals have sought to justify their dis-
obedience. In this process, ~t will be shown how the 
theories might be applied to group justification. 
The task in the following chapter is not to prove 
or disprove the justifiability of civil disobedience, 
but ·to investigate how standard justifications used to 
justify individual disobedience might be used to justify 
group disobedience. 
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CHAPTER II 
THEORIES FROM NATURAL LAW, RATIONALISM 
AND RULE UTILITARIANISM 
Three major theories which have been used to 
justify civil disobedience are Natural Law theory, 
Kantian Rationalism, and Rule Utilitarianism. The 
first two appeal to the right of conscience and establish 
a deontological normative framework with which the dis-
obedient can determine whether or not his action is 
justified. The latter appeals to the consequences of the 
action, providing a teleological framework by which the 
disobedient can decide if his action is justifiable in 
terms of increasing the general happiness of society. 
In Thomas Aquinas natural law starts from the nature of 
' 
the divine will and the laws operating in th~ universe 
and moves to the rational interpretation of the natural 
law in civil law. In Immanuel Kant, the justification for 
any disobedience must be interpreted according to an 
over-ruling norm perceived as obligating the individual 
through a sense of duty. In John Stuart Mill, without 
a free will the problem of justifying civil disobedience 
becomes that of choosing among conflicting drives and 
desires in anticipation of a good result. 
These systems raise special problems in that 
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they refer to the individual as moral agent, ~ut we shall 
try to apply them to groups as well. One particular 
diff~culty is applying the concept of individual 
conscience to the group. The individual may claim an 
act of disobedience is justified because of his duty 
to obey a higher law or to follow a universal and 
unconditional principle, or because of his desire to act 
for the greater happiness of society. Groups, although 
not specifically granted the right of conscience, will 
claim their actions are justified on similar grounds. 2 3 
The theories are considered as justifying civil disobed-
ience according to its generally accepted definition. 
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23aroups are assumed to be moral agents in this section~ 
Unless a ~istinction is being made between the individual 
and the group, the term agent will stand for both. 
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Thomistic Justification of Civil Disobedience 
The right of the individual conscience is often 
claimed as sufficient justification for civil disobedi-
ence. This right is often seen as being derived from the 
duty <:)f the individual conscience to obey a higher law, 
especially God's law, Thomas Aquinas' theory of natural 
law lends itself well to this sort of justification, for 
it recognizes an obligation to disobey a civil law which 
violates the divine law. The application of this justi-
fication theory to groups as well as individuals could 
bear closer scrutiny. 
For Aquinas, law is a dictate of practical reason 
directed to the common good, promulgated by an authority 
in the perfect community. The eternal law is the idea 
of the governance of the community of the universe by God. 
Natural law is the participation in the eternal law by 
creatures. Thus, it rules through the nature of the 
creature, i.e,, through its inclinations and impulses. 
Since man is a rational creature, natural law rules man 
through his reason, i.e., is a dictate of reason. Moreover 
man's very reason is a law-giving reason; thus civil 
laws ought to conform to natural law. But any civil law 
which conflicts with natural law is not a law. The first 
principle of natural law in man is to act according to 
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reason, Now since our concern is pract~cal reason rather 
than speculative, our concern is with the Good rather than 
with Being, The Good is the first concept of practical 
reason, for it is that to which practical reason is 
directed. 
Aquinas• first proposition of practical reason is 
that all things seek after the good. Thus the first precept 
becomes "Good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to 
be avoided. 1' 24 He states three classes of naturally known 
goods, i.e., natural inclinations; (1} self-preservation, 
(2) animal tendencies: sexual union, having offspring, 
education, and (3) the inclination to the good as the 
truth of God and the good of society. Thus far the person 
is not morally bound for these are not moral inclinations. 
But all the inclinations in the person belong to natural 
law in so far as they belong to reason,25 
Our main concern with Aquinas' natural law theory 
has to do with the use of it to justify civil disobedience. 
Question 96, Article 4, concerns itself with the power of 
the human law, whether a human law binds a person in 
24 Thomas Aqutnas,. Summa Theologica, (New, York; Benziger 
Brotbers: !nc,, 1947) 1 Vol. I, Pt. I-!!, Q, 94, Art.2, 
p. 1009' 
25The participation of a creature in the eternal law is 
natural law (Q. 91, II). We know the eternal law not in 
its:elf but in its effects., i.e., we participate in the 
knowledge of the truth. Natural law prescribes acts of 
virtue in general but not specifically. 
conscience. In the main argument Aquinas states, 
Laws framed by man are either just or unjust. 
If they be just, they have the power of binding in 
conscience, from the eternal law whence they are 
derived, according to Prov. viii.l5: By Me Kings 
reign, and lawgivers decree just things. Now laws 
are said to be just, both from the end, when to w~t, 
they are ordained to the common gooa:--- and from 
their author, that is to say, when the law that 
is made does not exceed the power of the lawgiver, 
-- and from their form when, to wit, burdens are 
laid on the subjec~according to an equality 2gf proportion and with a view to the common good. 
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Aquinas compares the participat~ons of an individual 
in the community to that of a part to a whole, thus the 
individual belongs to the community as the part does to 
the whole, thus if some loss is imposed upon the individual 
in order to save the community, the law which does this 
in proportionate manner is just, binding in conscience, 
and legal. 
But if a law is either contrary to human good 
either by the end to which it is directed, e.g., personal 
benefit of the sovereign rather than the whole, or re-
garding the author of the law, e.g., one who forms a 
law beyond his power, or according to the form of the law, 
e.g., unequal share of the burden, then these are unjust 
laws. ''The like are acts of violence rather than laws;" 
Aquinas quotes Augustine as saying the law which is not 
26Aquinas, Q. 96, Art. 4., p. 1019. 
31 
just seems to be no law at all. Thus these laws do not 
bind in conscience "except perhaps in order to avoid 
scandal or disturbance for which cause a man should yield 
his righ_t,,. "27 This last point in severely contested by 
modern practitioners of civil disobedience, for part 
of the method is often to create a disturbance. 
The second case in which laws do not bind in 
conscience is that of those lav-Is which are unjust "through 
being opposed to the divine good", e.g., laws of tyrants 
leading people into idolatry. These ought not be observed 
at all, because we ought to obey God rather than men.28 
Thus Aquinas would justify civil disobedience 
based on the right and obligation of the individual 
conscience to disobey laws which are contrary to the human 
good through improper end, form or authorization (except 
when it causes scandal), and those laws which are contrary 
to divine law, The task of the individual now becomes that 
of judging or discerning the correspondence of the civil 
laws to the human good and the divine good, This can lead 
in two directions: (1) the problem of ascertaining what 
is meant by the human good~ and (2) the epistemological 
problem of discerning what individual knowledge of violations 
of the human or divine good consists in. A further moral 
27Aquinasl p. 1020 
28Aquinas, p, 1020 
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dilemma with regard to judgment is that of the individual 
civ~l disobed~ent judging if scandal or greater harm to the 
community will be had in disobeying the law~ presuming 
the law is found to be unjust . 
. W'e cannot here deal with w-hat the Good is, or ~n 
what knowledge of the Good consists of knowlSdge of Evil. 
Our problem at the moment is one of judgment. How is a 
right formulation of conscience possible for the individual 
so that he may be justified in being disobedient? If 
the individual decides to disobey the law after investigating 
the facts as thoroughly as possible, after coming to an 
understanding of the common good and the divine good and 
of what is required of himself, and then applies this 
knowledge to the law, and if he sees that the law does not 
measure up to the standard of justice demanded by the 
nature of the law, then the disobedient no longer perceives 
himself as obligated by the law. There is no duty for 
him to obey the law from the specific law itself. At this 
point the individual's dilemma is not conflicting duties 
but how to act upon the felt overriding duty, i.e., to 
law in general, to the higher law, natural law and divine 
law. 
Granting that the individual is justified in 
disobeying the law according to the norms explicated by 
Aquinas, at the very least he has to demonstrate that his 
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action w~ll not lead tQ a worse injustice than the law 
would. He does not have to demonstrate that there would 
be a substantial improvement in the lots of the majority 
of society, only that there would not be greater harm 
done. This places some burden of proof on the individual, 
but not so great as demanded by some opponents of this form 
of justification,29 lf there is a natural insight and an 
inclination to virtue in all of us, as well as the strength 
of reason which enables us to participate in eternal law, 
then the right of the individual conscience would seem 
to be bolstered, But Aquinas does not rely only on the 
moral insight or intuition of the individual; he also 
recognizes the communal nature of the individual, and that 
natural law is the same in all men in rectitude and 
knowledge, and that man is inclined to reason. But this 
is in reference to speculative reason. In practical reason 
~uthand knowledge are not equally known by all nor the 
same for all. Natural law is the same for all, but the 
conclusions in specific cases may be different because of 
some obstacle, passion or evil habit.3° 
Thus, we see the primary role reason plays in 
29carl Cohen, Civil Disobedience (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1971)~ PPt 113-115, 
30Aquinas, p, 1011. 
determlnlng the indiVidual conscience, Law as an act of 
reason ought to be directed to the good, for that is that 
to which practical reason is directed, Civil law ought 
to be directed to the common good of the community, the 
end of which is universal happiness, But the general 
principles of natural law are not applied the same way 
universally ''on account of the great variety of human 
affairs."3l That is why we see a great variety of 
positive laws among different peoples, Yet human l.aw is 
derived from natural law and ought to be ordered to the 
common good. How this common good is to be interpreted 
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in specific cases is left open. That this openness is 
necessary shows a recognition of the possibility for a 
variety of interpretations of natural law by the framers 
of positive laws, That a variety of interpretations are 
possible comes from the existential situations in which 
nations and states find themselves, Moreover, it is 
recognized that natural law can be changed by addition, by 
Divine law and by human laws, and by subtraction in its 
secondary principles.3 2 This last point refers to Aquinas' 
discussion of whether natural law is the same in all men, 
which he previously demonstrated was the case except in 
matters of detail and certain conclusions falsely made 
31Aquinas~ p. 1015, 
32Aquinas~ p. 1011. 
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~ecau~e of obstacles, passions and evil disposition.33 
If the civil disobedient were suffering from some obstacle 
to understanding and truth) or if he were ruled by passion 
or an evil disposition, then he might reach a false conclu-
sion that a specific law were unjust but this would still 
require a conscientious refusal to obey it. 
It is for these very reasons that the right of 
the individual conscience as justified by natural law is 
so often rejected,3 4 But it is also for this reason that 
the civil disobedient usually seeks to purify his motives, 
seek the truth of the situation and be open to other 
interpretations, Yet, he will nonetheless disobey in 
accordance with his conscience. 
Opponents of the natural law justification for 
civil disobedience often point out that the sincerity of 
the individual while important may nonetheless be mis-
guided.35 Moreover, the ability of the individual to 
interpret the natural law in specific cases seems extra-
ordinary, and this task should be left up to the courts or 
legislature. While the disobedient may resort to higher law 
from a desire for certainty, universality, and justice, what 
33Aquinas, p. 1011. 
34cohen, pp. 115-117, 
35Aquinas allows for the possibility oimistaken conscience, 
but does not see it as an objective to his view. Summa, II 
Part I, Q. IX, Art.5; Q.l, 27. 
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results if often far from leading to the common good.36 
Finally, the higher law argument (natural law) justifies 
only direct civil disobedience, for to violate a just law 
in order to protest an unjust one as a tactical consider-
ation seems not to be justified by natural law. 
36cohen, Ibid, p. 118 
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Groups and Justification by Natural Law 
Given that individuals are justified in following 
their consciences even though they may be mistaken, and 
that they can disobey immoral laws or laws discovered to 
be unjust according to end, form~ or authority~ then 
it would seem that groups would be justified according 
to the same standards. The first, fifth., and sixtl1 
justifications established in the second chapter37 can 
be used to compare the group to the individual. Civil 
disobedience is not justified at this point by the nature 
of the actions or purposes of the individual or group, 
but because of the law's own lack of justification. Thus> 
if each meQber of the group is justified in opposing the 
unjust law> then the whole group is justified in opposing 
the law. 
If the group is considered to be a moral agent 
then it is justified i'n the same way as an individual. Let 
us assume the nearly ideal situation of a fairly cohesive 
dissident group, i.e,, the individuals are like-minded 
and united in their cause~ The group has a common purpose 
and acts through concensus, Just as the individual 
gathers facts, so too, the group gathers facts. Just as 
the individual weighs rights and duties, so too~ the group 
37(Chapter II,, p, 16.) 
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weighs rights and duties debating within itself. Just 
as the :l,ndividual is able to decide that he has a right 
or a duty to disobey th.e law·, so too can the group decide. 
Just as the individual knows the truth of natural law 
through evidence and can participate in eternal law through 
reason, similarly the group through its members is able to 
reason. (This is not to say that the group is a rational, 
sentient being; rather it is a moral agent because it has 
rights and responsibilities.) 
The strength of the group as the matrix of 
operations of the individual and society is two-fold; 
(1) there is a sharing of evidence and reason by the 
individual within the group, (2) there is a shared experience 
of the common good of society at least on a small scale. 
Through sharing evidence and reason, the members 
of the group can come to a fairly accurate understanding 
of why they oppose a certain law~ whether it is unjustly 
formulated, promulgated by an unjust authority, designed 
according to an immoral end, or opposes God's law. Each 
individual has a different perspective, and if all per-
spectives are shared equally~ it is possible to recognize 
common difficulties and disparateness of interpretations. 
While one perspective may be insufficient in determining 
whether or not a law is unjust and ought to be disobeyed, 
it is still possible to rely on several other perspectives 
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from other members of the group in order to shed light 
on the first. Although perspectives may differ completely 
at first gla~ce, what is gained is the possibility of 
breaking down obstacles of ignorance or bad conscience. 
A d~nger is that these obstacles can be reinforced 
depending on the motivation and degree of desire for truth 
in the group. A high willingness to admit the possibility 
of ignorance or wrongness coupled with an openess of 
interpretation is thus demanded as criterion for a group 
which claims to act as a moral conscience of society 
through disobedience of an established law, Unreflective 
dogmatism is rejected by the group. With such a criterion 
it is possible for the_group to have a rightly formulated 
conscience and be included in a Thomistic justification for 
civil disobedience. 
The second part of the group's strength is the 
shared experience of the common good. For Thomas, the 
law ought to be directed to the common good. But the 
disobedient group as a watch dog on the law is also 
concerned with the common good. But empirically an 
experience of some group is necessary for the individual 
to experience what is~ant by the common good. Through 
providing individuals with an experience of the common 
good, even if it is only the welfare of the group, the 
group is justified in so far as it provides a moral atmos-
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phere o.r locus of operat;i.on through wh;i.ch th.e individual 
can act for the common good and universal happiness. If 
the group is to be justified in acts of civil disobedience 
accord;i.ng to Thomistic standards 1 it must be directed, 
not only to ;its good, but also to the good of society as 
a whole, 
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J~stif~cation through Kant's Categorical Imperative 
A second means of justification used by disobedient 
agents to demonstrate the rightness of their actions is 
derived from Immanuel Kant's second formulation of the 
categor~cal imperative~ the duty to respect people as 
ends in themselves. Many might think it strange that 
people would use Kant to justify disobedie~ce since he 
so strongly recognizes the obligation of the individual 
to obey the law~ not only the moral law bUt the laws of 
the state as well. In spite of the diffiCUlties, people 
have attempted to justify their disobedience through his 
theory of duty. To understand these attempts we must 
first briefly review the Kantian project. 
The aim of Kant's Grundlegung zur Metphysik 
der Sitten38 is not to prove rational morality; rather it 
is to find the principle of a rational morality, on 
a priori ground. Kant's concern is not immediately 
that of experiential moral dilemmas; rather it is with 
finding the rational ground of morality. Universaliz-
ability and non-contradiction become the two criteria for 
the fundamental moral principle. And with regard to the 
38Kant, Immanual~ Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten~ 
(Hamburg: Kurt Weltzien K.G., 1965). 
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person, ~t ~s not necessarily the value that the person 
hol~s or the attitude of the person that is important, but 
rather the good will which acts from a sense of duty. This 
takes priority over the w~ll that acts from love, affection, 
or other virtues, 
Duty ts the necessity of an action done from respect 
for la~. But this law is not merely positive law; rather 
it is a command which ±s universal, i.e., it applies to 
every rational being. This moral law, as a categorical 
imperative, is single, unconditional,objective, formal 
(i.e. without content), Other moral principles are de-
rivatives of this first moral principle, 
Kant provides three major formulations of the 
categorical imperative: (1) "Always act on a maxim 
----·- - - ---- -------~ -~ -- ---
which you can will to become a universal law of nature;" 
(2) "Always act so that you treat humanity, whether in your 
own person or in another, as an end, and never merely 
as a means; (3) "Act always on a maxim by which the will 
considers itself as making universal law." Thus the 
most general formulatlon becomes "always act on the maxim 
which can at the same time be made a universal law."39 
Before any of these formulations can be applied 
39Brendan, Liddell, Kant on the Foundation of Morality 
(Bloomington, Indiana University Press~ 1970)pp. 140, 
157, 165, 177. 
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to the s~ecific case of civil disobedience it ~hould be 
noted that the categorical imperative is not intended as 
a guide to specific duties; rather ''it is a standard by 
which we Judge whether or not what we propose to do is 
mora1. 40 It has the negative function of measuring the 
intended action and the maxim on which the action is 
based by the stand~rds of universality, objectivity, 
rationality, and humanity. It is always directed to-
ward the dignity of the rational nature of man.41 
In w·arner Wick Is introduction to Kant Is The 
Metaphysics of Morals4 2 he states that 
"a moral community demands the utmost (but indefinite) 
effort to live up to the spirit of its constitution; 
and it strictly and definitely prohibits any will-
full breach in the law, for 4that would subvert the condition of its existence. 3 
With s~ch a statement one might think that there 
is no justification at all for civil disobedience given 
by the categorical im~erative. At the very least the 
burden of proof is on the disobedient agent. But the 
categorical imperative to act on a maxim that you can at 
40 Liddell, p. 178. 
41 Liddell, p. 184. 
42 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, Ed, Warner Wick, Trans. 
Jamei Ellington, (Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1964). 
43Ka.nt, p . .x;vii. 
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the s~me time w)-.11 to become a universal law· cannot and 
should not be immediately applied to specific acts of 
disobedience, or to obedience for that matter, 'rt is 
inaccurate to interpret the maxim as "disobey all iliaws 
which do not respect pers·ons as ends" or "obey all laws 
unconditionally," Only a more general and overriding moral 
principle (not derived from experience) is sufficient 
as a categorical imperative. 
The dilemma of applying a moral principle to 
concrete actions is best uncovered through an examination 
of the conflict of duties, Widerstreit der Pflichten, 
and the autonomy of the will. The civil disobedient must 
recognize his obligation, Verbindlichkeit,to obey the 
laws. But does this obligation arise from the right of 
the moral community to have the conditions for its 
existence undisturbed~ or from a personal obligation to 
act from the fundamental moral principle merely because that 
is one's duty? The first case seems to be more a case of 
the hypothetical imperative, e.g., if you value the moral 
community, obey its laws, If so~ it would not be suffic-
iently overriding as a moral norm. The second is more 
overriding, but is also more general and thus difficult 
to apply to specific cases. 
Kant states that "no particular definite obli.-
gation follows from (the formal rules) except when in-
demonstrable material principles of practical knowledge 
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are connected with them.44 It would seem that obligations 
to obey or obligations to disobey a particular law in a 
particular situation would require much more than merely 
a sense of duty based on a general formulation of the 
categorical imperative, 
The civil disobedient agent might grant Kant's 
a oriori formalisms but still want to give the moral 
law some content, This general content is usually given 
by disobedients to the second formulation of the categorical 
imperative as respect persons as ends, Kant himself 
sees that "our moral perfection and the happiness of 
others are ends which are also duties."45 
The dilemma posed by the confusion of the inter-
pretation of the law, the role of reason, and the impera-
tive to respect persons as ends in themselves returns us 
to Kant's focus on the good will, Regarding the autonomy 
of the will Kant recognizes that choice is free to the 
extent that it is determined by reason~ A person whose 
will is determined by reason will act according to the 
objective necessity of acting as determined by reason. 
Moreover, reason influences the imperfect will by acting 
44rmmanue1 Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, Trans. and 
Ed, Lewis Whi.te Beck (Chicago; University of Chicago 
fressl 19492 Pt 283. 
45Kant, Critique, p, 28, 
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as a restraint. An action is rational when a person acts 
from guiding principles, but the civil disobedient acts 
from guiding moral principles, therefore, even though 
his act defies positive law, it is nonetheless rational~6 
Since human laws are prescriptive (versus laws of 
nature which are descriptive) then as commands they can 
be obeyed or disobeyed. But the will links compliance 
to the law with knowledge of the law. Might this not 
indicate that a person may decide to obey or disobey a 
given law provided he knows what the law is and is able 
to freely choose between obedience and disobedience? 
In civil disobedience, this is a conscious, rationally 
willed act, not merely based on whim, habit, feelings, or 
intuitions. These other factors may enter into a decision 
to disobey, but it is in the free will informed by reason 
that the person decides.47 
Thus, the civil disobedient individual who wishes 
to justify his action on Kantian grounds must prove the 
rational basis for his decision. For 
"if we are to avoid a purely subjective moral stand-
ard, then we must appeal to reason as the source 
46Liddell, p. 104, 106. 
47Liddell, p. 105. 
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of moral goodness, not to any preconceived idea 
of the p~Sfection of Human Nature or to Divine 
Command. 
Morality is a matter of inherent consistency of action, 
not a pursuit of some value object. But as we have seen 
the value of the human community as an end is also a 
duty. 
Thus a rationally motivated civil disobedient 
action which has as its end the perfection and happiness 
of others might be construed as a duty. But it is a 
duty in conflict with the other duty to respect the law 
of the community as corning from the practical law as the 
efficient cause corning from rational beings.49 
An investigation of Kant's Right of Revolution50 
may shed light on the dilemma caused by conflicting duties 
to the laws of the state and to the laws of reason of the 
autonomous will. Kant's interpretation of what his strict 
formalism requires allows only for the possibility of 
disobedience against a tyrant if he commands a person 
to do an immoral action. Even with this the person has 
to be willing to suffer the consequences.51 In 
48 
Liddell, p. 5. 
4 9Kant~ Crit~que of Practical Reason, p, 31. 
5°Lewis Wh.;ite Beck, ''Kant and the Right of Revolution," 
JHl, 32 (1971). 
51Kant, Critique, p, 159 
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the conflict of duties between positive law of the state 
and "progress of mankind" the former takes precedencel 
for the latter "is a duty of imperfect obligation, is 
unenforceable, and lea,ves elbow-room for its realiza-
tion."52 The former is a duty of "strict or perfect 
obligation 11 and thus takes priority over the other,53 
Finally, resistance to the government is 
justified "provided some consti tv.tional provision is 
made •. ,under which there can be a formal legal finding 
that the original contract has been broken by the 
monarch."54 For if the legal contract is broken then 
the formal rule of law is challenged and must be restored, 
Beck in his article interprets Kant's position as allowing 
for passive disobedience, i.e., while a person might not 
be justified in actively breaking a law, it may be 
possible to justify a person not co-operating with a 
rule promulgated by a monarch who himself violates the 
law. 
Given such a case. of civil disobedience which 
does not seek to overthrow the government or sovereign, 
52:eeck~ p. 124~ 
53Beck;, p. 124. 
54 Beck, pp. 411-422. 
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but merely seeks to reform. the laws, it would seem that if 
the legislators or courts or ruler are not willing to 
listen to reason, i,e., if the laws are irrationally 
made or erratically enforced, then the disobedient would 
have sufficient reason Cas a rational individual) to 
disobey them, This is granted that all legal means have 
been tried and found wanting, Indeed it shall be seen 
that at least for the rational individual, as in Gandhi's 
case, this is claimed by Kantrs underlying philosophy. 
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Grou,pq, 8;TI,d K.antta.n Justification 
With the emphasis on reason, law, and the au,tomomous 
will, we have not gi;ven much room for justifying group 
civil di&obedience according to Kantian principles. Sev-
eral interpretations as to how to apply the categorical 
imperative to the groups are possible. Firstly, the 
group can be seen as a means of preserving the autonomy 
of the will of each of the individuals within society. 
Groups which are willing to act against positive laws 
as a. means of keeping people moral and free can be 
justified using the second formula of the categorical 
imperative in order to preserve tte third formula with 
regard to autonomy of the will, Secondly, the test of 
the individual moral will comes in the interaction of 
the individual and the community, but the locus for 
this interaction can be within various subgroups. A 
moral decision is made within a particular context even 
if it is guided by a universal principle, Thus, the 
group can be perceived as being the locus of the 
·interaction of moral agents and, as such, is justified in 
so far as the agents are justified. 
Finally, if the group is a moral agent then in a 
Kanti.an q,ystem of justi.f;tcation it must be considered 
a rational agent. As such it is considered to have an 
autonomous will. Once the a priori basis of the primary 
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mo~a~ prlnciple. governing the group 1 s actions, the group 
ca,n a.vo;id.. the trap of subj ecti,ve formal.ism by being abl.e 
to act on the .fundamental principle to respect persons 
as enda through giving specif,ic content to the prlnciple 
in the ce>ncrete interactions within the group itself. 
Moreover the group can formulate other particular 
principles deriving from the categorical imperatlve and 
act on them in society. 
For the group may act from a sense of duty as a. 
whole to the larger society and to the rational moral law. 
If the group is conscious of itself as acting on a maxim 
which can be a universal law and if it is rational, then 
like the individual, the group can feel a duty to disobey 
an irrational and. inhumane law or custom. But the process 
of disobedience must not allow the group to treat individ-_ 
uals as means to its end. 
Using the six ways a group may be justified dis-
cussed in the second chapter, we see that as applied to a 
Kantian justification of groups, the first and the sixth 
ways can be combined, and if the group is justified as a 
moral agent, then because it has a duty to follow the cate-
gorical ;imperative it is justified in the same way as 
individuals. Also the group may be justified according to 
ita purpose to preserve the autonomy of individual will 
~n society (the third way). 
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'l'he a pr;i,.or:i. forma.l:i.:sm of K:ant ~- $: mol;'al system ;i,s 
s-u..ff~cient to provide the disobed.ients w.J.th a structure 
for the:i.r ;r-at;i.onal 1Jsens.e 11 or moral duty 1 out it is 
:i.ns.u.:Cfic~ent to d.:i.ctate wl'l_at th.e content- of that d.uty 
is· ln s-pec;i.f;i.e cases-. While the !'orrnula.tion of the 
categor:t.cal i.mperative as respect persons as ends is a 
suf.fi..clent moral command for the d.:Lsobed.ient agent to 
act upon_, :i.t does not neces.sar.:Lly preclude d:i.sobed:i.ent 
action :i.n accordance with the perceived ool;i.gat:i.on to 
obey a rational moral co:rnm.and versus posltive lawt 
Normally dis.ooedient agents who take th.e categorical 
imperative in the second form do recognize the establish-
ment of the community or ends as an end in itself, and 
thereby act both from- a sense or duty and from a sense 
of value. 
.. ~{ · . ., 
Yet there are _those d;i,sobedients who claim that 
to act from a sense of''duty to a higher moral principle 
is insufficient_, and purity of intentton is an inadequate 
;tustif:i.cation. Rather the empirical sJ.tuat:i.on must oe 
taken into account~ and consequences are more important 
- ' 
than good motives. To elucidate this position we turn 
to. the utilitarian justification of civ:i.l disobedlence, 
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Justification through Utilitarianism 
Th_e most popular and perhaps most widely used 
theory of justification for civil disobedience stems 
from Utilitarianism. Civil disobedients generally 
have a great desire for the bettering of the conditions 
of society, for upholding the law as a means of insuring 
the greater happiness of the whole. Yet the law can be 
seen either as (l) hindering the positive development 
of society, or (2) keeping elements of society suppressed. 
Thus the greater happiness theory has been used to justify 
acts of disobedience with either or both of these two 
goals in mind,55 
Let us discover what the commonly accepted under-
standing of John Stuarts Mill's utilitarian theory is 
and then see how it has been used to justify civil dis-
obedience for lndividuals, and finally, see how it might 
be used to justify civil disobedience for groups, 
Mill'~ search for the first principle of morality 
led him to the nsummum bonum" as the greatest happiness 
for the majority, But this happiness is not merely lowly 
animal pleasures, but is found through the use of reason and 
an unde:rstanding of man's desires, Tne basic fact which 
55conen~ pp. 120-128, 
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Mill ~iscovered is that men do indeed des~re happiness, 
Tne prl.nc:iple by which actions are governed in order to 
ach1eve this happiness is: do that action which prodUces 
th_e g;J;"ea.te;st happ±,ness- for the greatest number. 56 
For M;ill happiness is constituted positively by 
pleasure and negatively by the absence of pain. But the 
pleasure wh;ich is sought is a higher pleasure, or ought 
to be, on the grounds that the majority of those who have 
experienced higher and lower pleasures say that the higher 
is better. 
Furthermore, happiness is for the greatest 
number, The inclination to seek happiness for the greatest 
number rather than merely for oneself i~ found through 
education and the role of the conscience. The conscience 
is a mass of feelings which incline one to act tn ways 
for the social good; it can be conditioned. A final point 
is that sacrifice for others is re~l and valuable, 
While there are many problems with this theory 
from a Kantian perspective, i.e. 2 that utilitarianism 
is teleological rather than deontolog1cal, that it in-
volves a conditional nought" or obligation rather than a 
catego~ical obligation, and that the ground of the obligation 
is not from reason but from social pressure, nonetheless 
it h.as certain advantages. The foremost advantage from 
56John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, Ed~ H, B. Acton, (London: 
J. M. Dent, 1972), p, 11, 29. 
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the Ka.ntian perspective 1E? that if a <tLsobedient acts 
from t~e ut;i,litarian principleJ he will seek the good of 
the whole community. A second advantage ;i,s that he will 
be willing to be judged by the consequences of the action, 
rather than his intentions alone~ 
Whlle the ;tnd;i:,vidual jus t;i,fies h.is civil dis-
obed;t.ence from the utili tar ian position three factors are 
involved: (a.) some proof of the immorality of the law, 
(b) dependence on evidence from the situation (for justi-
fication), (c) the role of consequences of the disobedient 
action. 
Since civil disobedience is usually directed towards 
changjrg a law or calling attention to some wrong in the 
community, the effectiveness of the disobedience can be 
measured by the law being changed or public opinion 
being turned in support of the disobedients. The emphasis 
of justi.f1cat1on of civil disobedience on util1ta.rian 
grounds 1s on the factual content of the a,ct in contrast 
to the K'antian moral form.57 Negative and positive effects 
must be weighedl and the disobedients must have some way 
of anticipating the outcome~ Again, this is in contrast 
to th.e K'ant;t.an justification from a given duty to disobey no 
matter wn.at the consequences. 
57cohen, Civil Disobedience, p. 124, 128. 
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rroof of immorality of the law cannot be on the 
gro~nds t~at it violates the categorical imperative or is 
in confl~ct with natural law or is against a person's 
particular moral system, It has to be shown to be having 
an actual negative effect on society or a portion of 
society. Some utilitari.an disobedients will claim that 
it can be declared i:m,moral if the law has no beneficial 
effects on society. That position is more difficult to 
defend, for with it these disobedients seek to justify 
thei.r acti.ons through sorne anticipated 'bettering of 
society with the possibility that society cannot bear the 
nimprovementn, e.g. National Socialists who preceive a 
pure society may use nonviolent civil disobedience to 
frighten away all n:i,mpure" elements of society. A larger 
problem is the distinction and connections of civil laws 
and morality. This cannot be avoided for disobedience 
is based on an understanding of the separateness yet 
connectedness of laws to a system of morals. The im-
moral:i,ty of the law from a utilitarian position is 
found in the law's deprivation of society's greatest 
happiness. 
Blackstone; while rejecting the adequacy of a 
justification of civil disobedience from utilitarian 
grounds~ nonetheless notes that from a teleological 
perspec.ttve society i.n th.e long run can benefit from 
57 
c1vil disobedience, for --
"if legal change is ineffective and too slow, 
civil disobedience is a better, more effective 
means for social progress, In a democracy with 
c;ivil disobedience, short range bad effects are 
offset by long range good effects of spe~ding 
up the 1 democratic process of change,' ''5() 
If the law is perceived as immoral on utilitarian 
grounds as· W'ell as natural law grounds or rational form-
alistic grounds, the individual conscience has a duty 
not to obey the law.59 
One basts a utilitarian would use to justify 
civil disobedience is that of the likelihood of success. 
One ingredient necessary for the success of civil dis-
obedience is a certain level of popular support. 60 
But groups or individuals which justify their disobedi-
ence according to the general values of the society will 
find greater support among the people. Even if a law 
is being disobeyed the populace in general may be sympathetic 
to a disobedient agent who can persuade the crowd that his 
actions are based in the people's own value system. 
Eccentric individuals and groups which do not 
-----------·-- --
act from a. value system similar to the ideals of the 
community wtll have less likelihood of success, and 
58Blackstone, p. 244. 
59Bayles, p. 8. 
60 MacFarlane, p. 29. 
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thereby, find little justification through this aspect 
of utilitarianism, ,For example, disobedient acts by the 
Klu Klux Klan or the Nazis, in northern states at least, 
would be more difficult to justify in todayts society, 
Or so:meone who d:tsobeyed the law in order to bring 
about a monarchy W'0Uld not have the popular support of 
people wi.th democratic values, 
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Gro~p& and Utilitarian Justificat~on 
Utilitarianism can best be used to justify group 
clvil disobedience through the actions of the group and 
through the gro~p being a matrix of operations for the 
;Lndiv~dual and s-ociety. As we have seen, the gro~p which 
reflects the moral ideals of a society has a better chance 
of' success than a radical fringe group, at least according 
to the ~tilitarian system. There is a good possibility 
that the gro~p can find more support for its position 
than the individual, because of the breadth of inter-
connectedness the group has with the rest of society 
through its members, through its organizational structure 
and through an attunement to the operations of political 
society. 
J:'f civil disobedience is to be J~dged according 
to its success or likelihood of succeeding, then the role 
of the group in society is also important. If success is 
. t"f . "l d" d" 61 h a reason to JUS ~ y c~v~ ~sobe ~ence, t en a group 
whose role would gain it public sympathy or a greater 
likelihood of legal support and who would be generally 
effective in changing the law would be easy to justify. 
For exa.mple ~ a group of nuc_lear scientists protesting the 
building of a nuclear power plant because of inadequate 
safeguards would oe more easily j~stified than a group 
of' college students engaged in similar disobedience, 
61Bayles, p. 74~ 
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Finally, the actionq of the group contribute to 
th_e judgment concerning whether or not the disobedience 
is justified. One reason for including nonviolence as 
part of the definition of civil disobedience is because 
the nonviolent behavior of the protestors is more likely 
to win support than hooliganism or violence. Those con-
cerned with being justified on utilitarian grounds are 
concerned with the tactics of the disobedience. In 
group disobedience this can be highly complicated process 
with questions asked regarding the best action directed 
toward with specific end, the behavior of the disobedient 
group, even regarding whether or not the group should 
resist arrest or not. The actions are also judged 
according to which will have more injurious or more 
beneficial effects on society. 
To summarize, groups are justified through 
utilitariansim primarily by the degree of effectiveness 
of the disobedient act in increasing the general happiness 
of society. This involves collected empirical data which 
could be a complicated process. Groups would seem to be 
easier to justify than individuals according to this 
theory because groups generally have a stronger position 
in society in terms of publicity and support. 
To summarize the th.ree common theories of justi-
fication, each of them is used to justify individual 
disobedience but can be used to justify group disobedience. 
61 
-~-'=~~~-~~law and a prior~-r~-~~~~~~~~m~~-~=:_1~~t-~-~-Z_ ~E~ __ g_ro_~p 
~f ~t ~s reg~rded as a moral agent. Utilitarian justi-
f~cation applied more to the nature of the actions of the 
group, its role in society, and its effectiveness as a 
matrix of between individuals and larger society. In 
so far as the appeal for justification is made according 
to the purposes of the group, the group wh_ich represents 
the ideals of seeking the greater happiness of society, 
the common good, the co:rnrnun;ity of ends, and w-hich de-
monstrates its concern through its public actions, will be 
more easily justified, Through the open and public 
operations of a group it can be seen whether or not it 
demonstrates a social conscience and operates out of 
concern for the common good by treating persons as ends 
in themselves and by seeking the greatest happiness of all. 
CHAPTER III 
NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR MORALLY JUSTIFIABLE 
CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 
In the last chapter we investigated forms of 
reasoning w-hich might be us_ed by agents to justify their 
civil disobedience. Certain reasons may be sufficient 
from the agent's point of view to justify an act of civil 
disobedience, but whether or not the disobedience is 
actually justified may be contested by an observer, 
According to the standard definition of civil disobedience, 
the action must be conscious, public, selective, an 
actual violation of a law or custom, nonviolent in char-
acter, and for the purpose of maintaining personal moral 
integrity or changing an unjust law. It must be proven 
that the law is unjust according either to its end, form~ 
authority, or rationality. Proper legal channels must 
have been tried (if feasible) a.nd found wanting. Finally~ 
the act cannot be for selfish gain, and for an act to 
constitute civil disobedience it is generally assumed 
that the agent is willing to accept the consequences of 
his disobedience in the form of legal punishment, 
The group (or individual) is not justified just 
because it is a moral agent or just because it has as its 
end the greater good of society. Not only must the end 
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be for the good of society (in social vs. personal civil 
disobedience), but the intentions of the disobedient agent 
and th.e form of the disobedient action must correspond to 
each oth.er\ From this will flow the end. (With MacFarlane 
and Gandhi and versus Bayles r hold that the moral integrity 
of the agent must be included in determining whether or 
not the disobedience is justified.) 
Therefore, whether the agent justified his own 
act of civil disobedience uqing reasons from natural 
law, rationalism or rule utilitarianism, two key areas 
involved in the justification are: (1) the form of the 
disobedience, (2) the intentions of the agent. A necessary 
condition, all other things being equal, for morally 
justifiable civil disobedience according to the form of 
the action, is that of nonviolence. A condition by which 
we can judge the moral sincerity of the agent is that of 
his w~llingness to suffer the consequences of the action. 
If these conditions are fulfilled, then whether or not 
the agent is correct in disobeying the law, the agent is 
at least morally justified in his action qua civil dis-
obedience, 
From the second chapter we have seen that non-
violence is included as a defining characteristic of civil 
clisobe.O.i.ence t Although some claim that certain acts of 
civil disobedience are justified even though they might 
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be yj,qlent~ w:e hope to show that generally the form of 
di~o~e~ience must be nonviolent in order for it to be 
justified for groups and individuals. 
Civil disobedience is also justified according 
to the intentions of the individual, whether it is to 
preserve moral integrity or to better society by changing 
unjust laws. One way to determine the moral integrity 
of th.e individual is to determine to what extent he is 
willing to suffer as a consequence of his disobedience. 
(We shall see if this applies to groups as well.) 
Thus, through the conditions of nonviolence and 
acceptance of suffering by the agent we hope to have 
two partial means of judging the justifiability of 
civil disobedience~ 
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Nonviolence 
Nonviolence is a principle of active peaceful 
resistance o.f a wrong through converting the perpetrator 
o.f the wrong. Althou,gh nonviolence is part of the classic 
definition of disobedience, (indeed civil disobedience 
is often chosen as a tactic of dissent because it is 
nonviolent) nonetheless there are those who would 
justify violent civil disobedience. But the argument 
here is not whether or not violence is ever justified 
in opposing an unjust government; that is a separate 
question involving the right of revolution and the possib-
ility of a just war. It would seem that if civil dis-
obedience is seen as a tactic in war, and if the violence 
in war is justified, then violent civil disobedience would 
be justified on similar grounds. However, our concern is 
with justi.fying nonviolent civil disobedience as it is 
normally practiced by groups of ;i,ndividuals. 
Violent civil disobedience is disallowed according 
to various theories. Bayles' argument is that given a 
hierarchy of goods, personal security is on or near the 
top, and to violate a higher good or a law preserving a 
highe:r good, to perserve a lower good is unJustifiable; 
th~rero~e~ to do v;tolence to a person is unjustifiable in 
civil disobedience, 62 
62Bayles, p. 17. 
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Bl~ck~tone merely claims that violent behavlor is con-
tra.d1ctory to the ~~-civility'' of the dis.obedience. 63 
Cohen ind,lcates that violent civil disobedience may be 
justifiable in some cases, but that from a practical 
viewpoint it is not desirable since it can obscure the 
purpose of the disobedience which is to expose an unjust 
situa.tion. 64 MacFarlane takes the position that if the 
authority or State is extremely oppressive and violent 
itself, then violent disobedience may be justified. But.,. 
"If constitutional methods are available or if non-
violent civil disobedience is possible, then the 
adoption of physical violence will be difficult 
to justify, unless it can be shown that the ob-
jective is of extreme gravity or necessity, that 
other methods of struggle are incapable of 
realizing it in the time required~ and that 
violence is capable of doing so." 5 
Violence and nonviolence can be seen as on a 
continuum. Violence is physical force used to injure a 
a person or propertyt Coercion can be included as a 
psychological form of violence which denies a person 
free choice. Not all nonviolent civil disobedience is 
justified, because there are some forms that are more 
coercive than others. In order to establish the moral 
claims of nonviolent civil disobedient agents their 
63 Blackstone, P~ 233. 
64coh_en, p. 24. 
65MacFarlane, pp. 47 - 48. 
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behavtor must be restrained and disciplined as well as 
physical nonviolent. 66 Nonviolent coe~cive civil dis-
obedience which deliberately provokes violence will be 
more difflcult to justify than that directed in a form 
directed ab a conversion rather than coercion. 
One reason nonviolence is claimed as a condition 
for morally justifiable civil disobedience is based on 
the interdependence of means and ends, 
66 4 Cohen., p. 3 • 
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Interdependence of Means and Ends 
Th.ere are two ways of arguing for nonviolent 
civil di&obedtence based on the interdependence of means 
and ends, The first is emplrical and can be disputed 
according to various interpretatons of empirical data. 
The second is pr;!:ma,rily metaphysical~ characterized by 
the law of' karma, althGugh it involves an empirical 
assumptton and finds support in Western thought as well 
as Eastern. One formulation of this principle or inter-
dependence of means and ends could be "as the means, so 
the ends." 
The empirical argument (which can be contested 
given contrary evidence) states that in a majority of 
cases violence has been used the consequence has been the 
continuation of ~iolence. This is typified by the saw 
nviolence begets v.iolence. '' It is backed up by evidence 
from history; societies which have been founded on, or 
revolutionized through means of, violence have in turn 
perpetuated that vtolence in some form or o.th_er. A 
counter to th.i$ argument is not to deny the violence of 
societies throughout h1$tory but to question the cause 
and effect relationship, Be that as it may, many ~ho 
advocate nonviolent disobedience do in fact claim that 
th_e reason nonviolence is chosen is beca.use they see 
violence as leading to violent consequences, and there is 
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a possibility that nonvtolence will lead to peaceful ends. 
The second interpretation of the interdependence 
of end.s and means as a. reason for including nonviolence 
as. a characteristic of civil disobedience uses the empirical 
argwnent to support it, but it is based more on the assumpt-
ion that the ends flows from the means. The end, the 
ultimate value for which the act is done, must find its 
roots in that very action, The agent cannot justify 
violence as part of his disobedience if he ~eeks a 
nonviolent society, If the agent intends the common 
good of society, and granted that the common good en-
tails peace in society, then the agent must use nonviolent 
means of achieving peace for his intentions and actions 
to be consistent, The agent cannot treat people as 
means if he operates from the norm of treating them as 
ends; he cannot seek personal gain alone if he desires 
the common good. But the agent can disobey the law·, 
as long as the law is not seen as an end in itselft La.w 
is only a means of attaining order in society. 
The most forceful proponent of the means - end 
interd.e.pendence argwnent is Mahatma Gandhi. Gandhi, 
unlike most European th~nkers, does not make a. sharp 
dist;inct.i.on between means and ends, Rather the two 
are s·e.en as ;interdependent. Nor does Ga.ndhJ. em,phas..i.ze the 
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end; rather he emphasizes the means.67 For G~ndhi the 
m.or~l q'Ll.aJJ .. ty of the end is dependent on the moral 
qual~ty of the mean. This focus on the means and on the 
sub~equent faith that the end will naturally follow 
stems from Gandh_i ~s belief in karma, 11 the law of ethical 
causation or moral retribution that links all the acts 
of interdependent individuals.H68 Every act has re-
purcusslons 1n society and returns back to the agent. 
The end will reflect the means. It is not necessary for 
the ends to look like the means~ but then a tree does 
not look like its seed, ~The means may be likened to a 
seed, the end to a treeJ and there is just the same 
inviolable connection between the means and the end as 
there is between the seed and the tree. 11 69 If the law 
of karma holds, then there is no way ;in Which the end and 
means can be separated, 
Since the purpose of civil disobedience is to make 
some beneficial change in society, and since it intends the 
means least harmful and most conducive to its end, and 
since the end flows from the means, then the form of the 
disoQ.ed~ence m.ust be nonviolent •. ·· !!Nonviolence is justified 
67Rag.P.avan Iyer ~ The Moral and Political Thought of 
r-1ang,ta_ma Gandhi, (New York; OJC.ford Univers~ty Press: 
1973L P· 361~ 
68 ryer, p. 361. 
69 ryer, p. 361, 
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by Gandhi because it seeks to achieve an integration 
between mea.nq and ends,n70 
Qa.ndhi states~ "As the means so the end. Violent 
means w~ll give violent swaraj (soul force2\"7l Pure 
mean~ lead to pure results~ impure means lead to impure 
results. Thus,, 
11 We cannot attain to any truth through untruthful 
means,,,,we cannot secure justice through unjust 
means, or freedom through tyrannical acts, or 
socialism through enmity and coercion, or enduring 
peace through war."72 
If we seek a truthful and peaceful society, our means must 
be truthful and peaceful; to the degree that our means _are 
peaceful and truthful, so our results will be peaceful 
and truthful. 
Although I appeal heavily to Gandhi in the support 
of nonviolence through the ends-means interdependence 
-----·-----------~-.-
argument, I do so not because Gandhi himself holds the 
position but because he seems to have the best formulation 
of it. 
70 ' Y~-Y~:~amana, .Murt;L, nauberls Dialogue and Gandhi's 
Satyagraha:''- Journal of the HJstory of Ideas? 29 (1968) 
6os. 
71:MoP-_andas Gandh_i., Young India, July 17 -t 1924, In Murti, 
p t 608. 
72 ryer 1 p, 363, 
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Cohen supports the Gandian position of the inter-
dependence of means and ends. 
''Finally, if the civil disobedient really has, as he 
professes, the goal of a peaceful and just society, 
he will do what he can to exhibit peacefulness and 
justice in his own conduct. He is likely to under-
stand that the character of the means one employs in 
social action greatly influences the character of the 
results accomplished. The interpretation of means 
and ends, their mutual support or mutual corruption~ 
has been well understood by nonviolent activists 
through the generations ....... The principle applies 
not only to wars and their outcomes; it is more 
generally true that it is not possible to bring 
about an orderly and humane society through inhumane 
and disorderly conduct. Everywhere, violence in the 
means will infect the ends, Therefore, his object 
being what it is, the honorable civil disobedient 
has a special obligation to pursue his protest in a 
,way that i~f~icts no direct serious harm on any 
person .... 
Nonviolence is accepted as a condition of morally justiable 
civil disobedience because it integrates the means and 
the ends. 
But the discussion has centered primarily on 
social civil disobedience, i.e.~ that done for the good 
of society. With regard to personal civil disobedience, 
nonviolence is again claimed as a condition for morally 
justifiable disobedience based on the interdependence of 
means and ends. Personal civil disobedience has as 
its end ~pholding personal moral integrity. Gandhi holds, 
and I agree, that ''no man can pursue greater integrity 
as an end by adopting means involving a sacrifice of the 
73 Cohen, pp. 30-31. 
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integrity he already has.rr7 4 And nonv~olence is the 
test of a person's moral integrity or personal truth. 
Gandhi, guided by the two ethical concepts of 
satya (truth) and ahimsa (nonviolence)~ is very much 
aware of the frality of humanity, of the possibility of 
being misguided even with the best of intentions. Thus, 
in seeking the truth he encourages a humility and self-
purification which ensures that if the agent misses the 
truth none will suffer harm but himself. Civil disobedience 
must be nonviolent because of the possibility of the agent 
being mistaken in his judgment regarding the means or the 
end or the law opposed. For if the agent recognizes that 
the law can be wrong in its end, its formulation, or 
operations, then he must be willing to accept the possibility 
of personal and group error as well. It is possible to 
have good intentions and yet be wrong. 
Violence forcibly imposes the will of a group or 
a person on society. Nonviolence (if well regulated) 
acts as a guarantee that nobody will be hurt intentionally 
whether or not the act of disobedience is rightly con-
ceived.75 
Civil disobedience demands of the individual a 
74 
Iyer, P~ 371~ 
75MacFarlane disagrees, p. 46. 
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high regard for society, for truth, rationality, humility 
and selflessness, and a strong sense of duty to follow 
one's conscience. Civil disobedience demands of the 
group the recognition of individual differences and 
similar regard for truth and the good of society. 
Finally, civil disobedience demands that the agent use 
truly nonviolent means in order for the ends to follow 
the social benefits of truth and peace and the preservation 
of the agent's integrity. 
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Self-Suffering 
According to Gandhi true civil disobedience 
can be practiced only by those who are trained and 
purified in order that their motives be unselfish and 
their actions be truly nonviolent, In order to demon-
strate the purity and selflessness of his motives the 
civil disobedient must be willing to accept suffering as 
part of the means. I hold that in order to judge the 
moral sincerity of an agent, one condition that must be 
fulfilled is his willingness to suffer for his cause. 
While this is not sufficient condition of civil dis-
obedience being justified, it is a necessary condition 
all other things being equal. 
This self-suffering takes on very concrete forms; 
imprisonment, public ridicule, physical and psychological 
abuse, disruption of normal lifestyle, estrangement from 
family and friends, loss of employment, loss of social 
prestige, anxiety, depression, and even death. 
Why should ~ person or group risk such suffering? 
The personal and idelogical reasons may vary, but from 
the perspective of justification of the action willingness 
to accept suffering is: (a) at least practically advisable, 
for any action in defiance of the State will most likely 
result in some suffering, especially the possibility of 
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impri;:;onment; (b) it is advantageous in terms of public 
opinion, for through demonstrating conviction and self-
lessness there is a possibility of convincing the public, 
arbitrators, and even opponents of the truth of one's 
position, Tied in with this last point suffering is 
accepted (c) in order to convert the opponent to one's 
cause and to demonstrate onets love for the opponent. 
It is not intended to coerce the opponent. Some accused 
Gandhi of trying to coerce the British and recalcitrant 
Indians with his own "fast to the death" .• but when he 
discovered this he terminated the fast and tried a 
different form of disobedience which would net be mis-
understood as coercive.7 6 Willingness to suffer may be 
(d) demanded as a duty arising from the moral law within 
ther person or community. In order to fulfill one's 
duty to self and to others suffering can be recognized 
not merely as a price to be paid, but as a positive means 
of respecting persons as ends in themselves. This is 
usually seen in the cases of passive resistance and non-
resistance, wherein the disobedient agent accepts the vio-
lence of another without retaliating. Finally, (e) will-
ingness to suffer may come from the agent's perception of 
natural law; the agent may perceive his obligation to 
God ~nd the community to be so strong that security and 
76For accounts of Gandhi's fasts see Joan Bondurantts 
Conquest of Violence, pp, 37, 71, 87, 118, and 
Eriksons Gandhi'· s Truth. 
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self-pre~ervation take second place. This also holds 
for the duty of preserving the integrity of one's 
conscience. 
Political justification qua civil disobedience 
is not ordinarily given to groups with solely selfish 
concerns or with power over others, even if some social 
advantage accrues.77 But what can convince others that 
the concerns of the group or individual are not merely 
selfish and that the agent does not hold power over 
others, but as truly civilly disobedient the agent seeks 
to convert rather than coerce? Gandhi uses terms which 
indicate a selfless purification and a renunciation or 
detachment from the fruits of one's labors: non-possessive-
ness (vitaraga) , selflessness (anasakti), renunciation of 
actions (sannyasa), and especially self-suffering as 
purification (tapas).78 
MacFarlane understands the value of willingness 
to suffer on the part of the group in a utilitarian vein. 
Since civil disobedience as a tactic is often directed at 
gaining public support, one way to accomplish that support 
is through the willingness of the group to suffer, But 
the justification itself turns on the purpose, nature, 
77MacFarlane, p. 28, 
78Iyer, pp. 423-427. 
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circumstances and consequences of the act itself and 
not on the willingness to suffer punishment. "Personal 
integrity and adherence to conscience are no guarantees 
of justification~ although justification is impossible 
without them."7S Thus willingness to suffer is a necessary 
factor in justification for civil disobedience even though 
it is not sufficient in itself. 
But for Gandhi it is only individual disobedience 
which demands purification of motives and self-suffering 
as a demonstration of selfessness. Indeed in such a case 
Gandhi calls civil disobedience a "terrifying synonym for 
suffering."79 But mass or group civil disobedience can 
be selfish in that individuals hope for some personal 
gain. Also groups cannot be expected to act from en-
tirely altruistic motives. Raghavan Iyer in The r·1oral and 
Political Thought of Mahatma Gandi summarizes Gandhi's 
position: 
"Civil disobedience is exercised by the masses as an 
inherent and legitimate right to secure the recog-
nition of claims that they regard as due to them as 
citizens. In the case of individual resisters, 
their civil disobedience is simply the performance 
of a duty that they o~B themselves under the dictates 
of their conscience," 
Self-suffering also relates directly to the 
MacFarlane, p.36, 
79Lyer, quoting Gandhi in Young India, April, 1926, 
80iyer, p, 279. 
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ques~ion of whether or not punishment by a legitlmate 
authority should be accepted by the disobedient agent. 
In BlacKstone's "Appeal to Justice'J argument for justi-
fication he note$ that to say that 1 by becoming a member 
of a democracy and enjoying its fruits, a person agrees 
to live by all the rules and therefore cannot engage in 
civil disobedience, does not hold. The argument he 
refutes continues to the point that if a person does 
engage in civil disobedience he must accept the con-
sequences. But Blackstone holds that a person's obedience 
to a democratic State is not absolute but prima facie 
and can be overrideen by other moral considerations. Those 
who accept punishment for trying to live by their moral 
convictions or for trying to better society or preserve 
the rights of others receive disproportionate treatment 
in society, i.e., they take on the burdens of society 
through their punishment. Thus this contradicts the 
argument of those who say that the lawless disobedients 
can enjoy the benefits of society but can disobey the 
rules and burden the State. Finally, it is society as 
a whole which benefits from the actions of the disobedients 
in the long run."Sl 
Finally, from a Gandhian view voluntary suffering 
will prevail over calculated violencet With a similar 
view Don Morano in ''Civil Disohedience and Legal Respon-
81Blacksstone, p. 244. 
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sibility'' lauds the civil disobedient for leading judges 
and lawmakers to reevaluate their positions, i.e.~ if 
they have become morally insensitive or careless. The 
disobedient who acts with no hope of personal advantage 
and is willing to provide arguments in defense of his 
positions demonstrates a true legal responsibility which 
includes a ''delving and criticism of existing laws". 
"Therefore, the civilly disobedient individual, who is 
willing to put his head on the block in order to abrogate 
unjust laws, is in fact the legal~responsible individual 
par excellence."82 
To summarize, civil disobedience is not justi-
fied merely according to the end intended, i.e., changing 
an unjust law to benefit the common good or to preserve 
personal moral integrity. The form of the disobedience 
and the moral sincerity of the agent also play a part in 
justifying civil disobedience. A necessary condition 
(all other things being equal) for the form of the 
disobedience to be morally justified is that of non-
violence. Several reasons were given for the inclusion 
of nonviolence as a condition of civil disobedience~ the 
main reason being that it demonstrates the interdependence 
of means and ends. One condition for judging the moral 
sincerity of the agent is his willingness to suffer. 
The willingness to bear suffering demonstrates the agent's 
82Donald ~·1orano, "Civil Disobedience a,nd Legal Respon-
sibility", Journal of Value Inquiry, 5 (1971) 193. 
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conviction and selflessness. Thus, whether the agent 
justifies the disobedience through natural law, a priori 
formalism,or utilitarianism the conditions of nonviolence 
and self-suffering a,id in justifying the act qua civil 
disobedience. 
·Ha,ving investigated the reasons given for 
justifying civil disobedience and having examined two 
conditions for morally justifiable civil disobedience 
for groups and individuals, it is now possible to see 
how these might apply differently to groups and to 
individuals. 
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CHAPTER IV 
INDIVIDUAL DISOBEDIENCE VS. GROUP DISOBEDIENCE 
With all the restrictions and requirements for 
proper justification for individual disobedience it would 
seem to be difficult for the person to carry out justi-
fiable disobedience. Even with the emphasis on the in-
dividual conscience and how it is so often justified 
through natural law, a priori formalism and utilitarianism 
nonetheless strong arguments can be raised against the 
individual conscience. The discussion of the limits of 
the individual disobedient was introduced in the second 
chapter through the distinction between personal and 
social civil disobedience. 
Personal disobedience, a matter of conscience, 
often is carried out to preserve the moral integrity of 
the agent. For example, a devoutly religious person who 
interprets the command "Do not kill" to mean "Do not 
engage in armed combat or even support armed combat in 
any situationn may feel morally obligated to refuse a 
government's draft call. He may do this, not because 
he feels that war is wrong for society, or that this 
particular war is unjust, or that he finds the sight of 
blood disgusting, but because he would violate his con-
science if he killed. The other factors may enter into 
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his decision but are not the justification or the ground 
of his position. 
Social civil disobedience, on the other hand, is 
motivated by a positive desire to preserve a good in 
society, to better society, or to eliminate an evil in 
society. The action may be directed to defending the 
right of one person, of a minority, or of the whole. 
Thus, an individual engaged in social civil disobedience 
may, for example, refuse to be drafted not because he 
himself cannot kill, but because he perceives the war 
as harmful to society or as unjustly waged. The group 
can fit under both personal and social civil disobedience 
categories if it is seen as a unit. 
In the first chapter we saw that the possibility 
of the tyranny of the individual conscience led to the 
positing of the group as a moral agent of civil dis-
obedience. In the second chapter we saw that the three 
theories used to justify civil disobedience according 
to the rational and social nature of the individual 
conscience could also justify group civil disobedience. 
In the third chapter the conditions of nonviolence and 
willingness to suffer were added to justify the form 
of the disobedience and the moral sincerity of the agent. 
These two conditions seem to be sufficient to counter 
the dangers of the tyranny of the individual conscience. 
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The individual conscience which is misinformed 
or is evil, if given the supreme right to do as it 
pleases without taking into account the good of the commun-
ity, is dangerous to that community. To say that it has 
a prima facie right to disobey any law it perceives as 
unjust or not to its personal advantage is to look too 
superficially at the relationship between the individual 
and the community. For the individual to have a properly 
formulated conscience it must be concerned with the needs 
of the larger society. 
The Gandhian requirements of satyagraha (truth-
force),83 nonviolence, and self-suffering can be seen as 
means of enhancing a communal consciousness in the sense 
of forming and developing a socially aware and concerned 
individual conscience. Such a conscience once purified 
through satyagraha, suffering and nonviolence cannot be 
accused of selfishness or tyranny. Thus, a person 
purified to act according to the greater good of society 
but motivated by a sense of duty to follow the truth 
nonviolently and to obey the highest law would be worthy 
to be civilly disobedient according to Gandhi. 
83satyagraha, truth-force, is a technique and philosophy 
of nonviolent resistence which is based in Gandhi's 
interpretation of karma in the social-political realm, 
and from which comes morally justifiable civil dis-
obedience. For Gandhi, only the true ~atyagrahi 
(agent of satyagraha), trained in nonviolence and 
purified in his intentions through accepting suffering, 
can engage in true civil disobedience. 
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This is not to say that non-satyagrahi character 
types would not be justified in committing civil dis-
obedience, A Gandhian ethic as applied to the individual 
does demand strigent requirements. A person of that 
character type can be more easily justified according 
to the Gandhian theory, especially since the disobedience 
comes from a sense of duty and is directed to the good 
of society. 
Whether or not a person is a Gandhian satyagrahi, 
a Gandian theory of ethics seems to justify civil dis-
obedience for the individual more easily than any one 
other theory of ethics alone, It contains elements of 
the natural law position and of Kantian rationalism. 
Indeed Gandhi is often viewed as Kantian with his 
emphasis on the interdependence of means and ends further 
emphasis on duty and the individual conscience.8 4 The 
Gandhian emphasis on the interdependence of means and ends 
further guarantees proper motivation and nonviolent action 
by the individual which the utilitarian position does 
not guarantee. To justify one's actions on utilitarian 
grounds without the Gandhian conditions being fulfilled 
would seem to bring the problem back to the tyranny of 
the individual conscience, 
Both the Kantian and Thomistic positions would 
84 Iyer, p. 71. 
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involve some willingness to suffer by the disobedient, 
if only for satisfaction of duty to the State through 
accepting valid punishment for the good of the whole. 
Thomas is concerned lest the disobedience cause a scandal 
or disturbance, but nonviolent disobedience would seem 
to cause less scandal than violent disobedience or 
rebellion. 84 (It is another question altogether to ask 
whether Kant, who had such a difficult time condoning 
rebellion would support non-violent revolution.) 
Is it sufficient,then, to have socially-aware 
individual disobedients justified without trying to 
justify groups as we have attempted? There is no reason 
to turn to the groups to justify civil disobedience on 
the basis of the insufficiency of the individual if the 
Gandhian criteria are employed. But can we turn to the 
group on its own merits? And furthermore, can the 
group be more than the locus for individual civil dis-
obedience, but be considered an agent itself? 
In the first chapter the advantages and disad-
vantages of turning to the group were enumerated. Through-
out the paper the fifth way of interpreting the groups's 
justification was used, i.e., considering it as a moral 
agent operating in the same way as an individual moral 
agent. Diffe~ences and distinctions were noted, especially 
84
rn some cases violent overthrow may be more stabilizing 
and less damaging. MacFarlane,_QE. cit., p. 46. 
in the decision-making process, the question of rights 
and obligations, and knowledge and information sharing. 
To interpret the group as operating like an individual, 
it is supposed to have a consciousness of its own, a 
collective conscience, and, therefore, the moral rights 
and obligations a conscience has. 
Many groups already have legal rights and obligat-
ions; governmental agencies, international Non-govern-
mental Organizations (NGO's), corporations, and church 
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groups. Other more informal group~ and clubs can be said to 
have lives of their own. Although not bound by external laws, 
they have their own rules and fundamental purposes and 
reasons for existing. Granted that the rules and purposes 
of the group are formed by the individual members acting 
in concert, (although mutual agreement, concensus, majority 
vote, compromise, etc.) they are beyond each individual 
member. This is not to say that groups are ontologically 
separate from members, for each group is very dependent 
on its membership and the members' ideas, purposes, de-
grees of conformity to the rules, relationships with each 
other and actions. But the group is at least a matrix 
between the individual and larger society as posited in 
the first chapter. It is a qualitatively different 
entity than a mere conglomeration of diverse individuals. 
There is an agreement and a unity to the decision-making, 
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whether through concensus, compromise, majority vote, or 
brute force. There emerges something from this decision-
mak~ng process which ~s called the will of the group. To 
oppose the will of the group constitutes disloyalty, 
disobedience or dissent, Of course, the will can include 
the right and obligation of the members to disobey any 
decision which goes against the individual's conscience. 
But it is assumed that in the small group there is a 
general conscience which is formed by and reflected back 
onto the individual consciences. The will of the group 
can change, and it is changed by the members, but that 
does not deny the existence of the common will. If there 
is no unity of will, then the group dissolves. It can 
no longer be called a single agent, but is a conglomer-
ation of individual agents, 
To posit such an entity invokes frightening 
images of totalitarianism. Indeed Gandhi, the champion 
of the individual conscience, rejects the possibility of 
a mass conscience. Even through Gandhi was the proponent 
of mass civil d~sobedience, he could not justify mass 
civil disobedience on the same grounds as individual 
disobedience because of his rejection of the mass 
conscience.85 
5 Iyer, p. 279. 
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What the. individ~al and the group have in common, 
according to Gandhi, is the willingness to undergo suff-
ering and the strict adherence to nonviolent methods. 
Yet the gro~p can be selfish as the individual cannot, 
for the group at least agitates for the rights of a 
minority, even if it is the group itself which is the 
minority,86 But for Gandhi to imply selfish motives 
of the group, seems to indicate a certain ambiguity in 
terms of considering the group as an agent with a con-
science. To call a group's motives selfish is to use the 
language of the individual. It also implies a unity of 
desire which might imply consciousness of some sort. If 
the desire is unified, then it is more than the sum of 
individual desires. 
For example, let ~s say a group of white parents 
do not want to obey a Federal Law ordering them to bus 
their children to schools which are predominatly black. 
They band together, and form a strategy of non-cooperation, 
keeping their children home. The overall purpose is to 
change the law or to agitate for the rights of the 
parents to $end their children to whatever schoool they 
wish. This is a selfish form of disobedience, and even 
tho~gh it may be wrongly conceived, it may be justifiable 
on Ga.ndian grounds. At least the group of parents are 
justified in wanting the best education for their 
87 Iyer, p. 280. 
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children. Individwal pa~ents may have differing desires 
and reasons for boycotting the bussing order. One parent 
may think she is starting a revolution against the 
federal government. Another may be merely concerned 
for his child. A third might hate blacks, while another 
thinks this action will benefit both blacks and whites. 
But as a group these individual reasons are subsumed 
under the predominate purpose of changing the law and 
agitating for the group's rights. 
(Civil disobedience, as applied to the dynamics 
of a group, does have a radically different dimension 
than as applied to an individual.) For while the 
individual must always decide for himself, must make a 
conscious, free intelligent choice, it is in the context 
of the group that this choice is made. The individual 
operates within a sphere of other persons, and his 
decisions and actions are seldom merely privative (ex-
cept perhaps in the case of the hermit or mystic). The 
social nature of the person demands that there be an 
interaction of the. person and the other. But this is 
done in the social community. 
Yet we cannot speak of community in abstract 
terms. Even though the d1sobedient may justify his action 
by saying~ ''I do this for the good of humanity, for the 
good of the world,'' it is in fact an action done in the 
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context of the local mileau. The indiv~dual's decision 
to oppose a law set to regulate the larger community is 
carried out in his local community, or group. Let us 
t~ke ~trivial example: the disobedient act of jaywalking. 
A person generally follows the rule not to jaywalk, or 
positively, to obey the traffic regulations. He may obey 
for a variety of reasons: habit, self-preservation, fear 
of punishment, sense of duty, half-hearted and unartic-
ulated respect for the law, whatever. But when a person 
disobeys this particular law it is usually for his immediate 
advantage coupled with the absence of a coercive force 
against him. The trite and unreflective justification by 
the individual may sound like this: "I had to get to the 
other side, and I did not see any police." The absence 
of any coercive force gives the person a subjective sense 
of freedom to disobey the law. No higher justification 
is sought or claimed. But what is happening here is that 
this act of disobedience depends on a concrete situation, 
a relationship between the jaywalker and the present or 
absent policeman. The person is in a communal relation 
with the present or ~bsent coercive force. It is not a 
case of being ~gainst the law in general or law enforcement 
officers in general. The disobedience is carried out in 
an irrunediate communal context. If the act of disobedience 
were different and for a higher purpose, the disobedient 
individual would still operate within an immediate communal 
context. 
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But there is an additional element when the 
group carries out a civil disobedience campaign. No 
longer is it the individual acting within but against the 
large community, but it is a community acting against the 
larger society (but for the benefit of the larger 
society}. True group, or communal~ disobedience requires 
the unity of will and purpose investigated earlier in 
this chapter. It entails the social nature of the in-
dividuals in the group; it relies on the sharing of know-
ledge and ideals of the members of the group, It demands 
a discipline and a willingness to accept responsibility 
on the part of the members. Finally, it depends on the 
conscious and free choice of each of the members to 
support the group, the purpose of the group, and the 
disobedient action to be chosen by the group. 
The group as a whole must allow for the dissent 
and disagreement of individual members~ lest it suffer 
from the charge of totalitarianism, Indeed, to be con-
sistent with a policy calling for selective disobedience 
against the laws of the larger society, the group should 
allow for individual disobedience of any of its actions 
which violate the individual conscience, But what is 
presumeq with the group as a disobedient community is 
that it ~as a single conscience formed by the decisions of 
its members. Thus~ the group has a sense of its rights 
and obligations. In the case of its disobedience it has 
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a gene~al right or obligation depending on the situation 
and the conditions outlined in the previous chapters. 
To summarize; the individual is best justified 
if he fulfills the conditions of nonviolence and willing-
ness to suffer, otherwise the tyranny of the individual 
conscience generally will preclude justification except 
through the group. The group need not accept suffering 
as a condition for disobedience since its ends may be 
selfish in part. For civil disobedience to be justified 
for the group~ it must have a united will and yet allow 
the members to follow their own consciences. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
Given that civil disobedience is justified in 
some cases, we have tried to pinpoint the conditions for 
the justification of both individual and group civil dis-
obedience. Acknowledging with Gandhi that there can be 
no one system of hard and fast rules that apply univer-
sally for civil disobedience, nonetheless, I would like 
to set some guidlines for groups and individuals. 
Firstly, individuals and groups have a moral 
right to disobey directly unjust laws or symbolically 
unjust laws. 88 Individuals have a right to follow their 
consciences, and although they have an obligation to 
form their consciences as accurately as possible, mis-
takeness does not abrogate the right of disobedience. 
However, the right of disobedience may be superceded by 
88
one requirement often given in order for civil disobed-
ience to be justified is that the law disobeyed must 
be perceived as immoral or unjustifiable. A qualification 
is needed here. Civil disobedience can be of two types: 
direct or indirect. Direct civil disobedience means 
the violation of a law, policy or custom of society 
which is not itself perceived as immoral but is symbolic 
or is the only effective means of public protest against 
the law, custom, or policy opposed. An example of this 
is the common tactic of trespass or obstruction of 
traffic in front of buildings perceived by the protestors 
as being used for immoral purposes, e.g., draft offices, 
the Pentagon, military and nuclear complexes. 
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a higher obligation and must be discerned carefully. 
The group has a similar right but this right depends upon 
the nature of the group, i,e., to the degree that it 
allows freedom of choice in its members and has a united 
will, A m9b is not justified as is a group. The right 
to disobedience depends also on the nature of the action, 
violent disobedience being much more difficult to justify 
than nonviolent disobedience. 
Secondly, individuals and groups have a duty to 
disobey the law in some cases. For the individual this 
duty can arise from the obligation to obey a higher 
law or the obligation to follow one's conscience. For 
the group it can arise from the obligation of the group to 
the welfare of its members and the good of the larger 
society as well as the obligation to obey a higher law 
and to follow the group's conscience. The duty to disobey 
needs to be justified as taking precedence over other 
duties. 
Thirdly, specific conditions are required for the 
justification of civil disobedience for both groups and 
individuals. The truth of the situation should be s6ught 
impartially, i.e., the intention is not to prove one's 
own pos1t1on, but to seek to resolve an unjust situation. 
The means are nonviolent; harm is not intended to those who 
oppose the disobedient agent. The disobedience is directed 
to the greater good of the society or the minority group. 
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It can also be for the personal moral integrity of the 
individual, There is a willingness on the part of the 
agent to accept suffering, but not necessarily punishment 
by the State. Tne ends and means are interdependent, thus 
the ends do not justify the means. Consequences of one's 
action are taken into account on a tactical level, On 
a moral level the individual or group is responsible only 
for the forseeable consequences, (Thus, arguments such 
as "if one is permitted to disobey, all will disobey, 
therefore society will be destroyed" are insufficient 
blocks to the right or obligation to disobey.) The 
disobedience must be freely chosen by the group or 
individual and not be accidental or coerced. Finally, 
the justification for the civil disobedience depends 
on the concrete situation, the unjust form or execution 
of the law which is opposed and the satisfactory prior 
use of legitimate channels of dissent. 
The nature of the disobedient individual is such 
that he has a communal conscience, i.e., is responsible 
to, and aware of the needs of, larger society. The nature 
of the disobedient group is such that it is both respon-
sible to larger society and to its members. It has a 
unity of will that it may be called analogously an 
individual with a social conscience. And it is the 
matrix of action and decision-making for society and 
the individual. As such, it can be an effective agent of 
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civil ctisobedience and social change through the rational 
sharing of information and moral purpose and through 
being a testing ground for an experience of the common 
good. 
Truthful, nonviolent civil disobedience is a 
difficult task for the conscientious individual, much 
less for the group. It can be, and has been, misused 
by groups and persons for selfish gain or as a military 
tactic. If, however~ it is seen in the wider context 
of satyagraha as morally justifiable action flowing 
from a sense of duty to larger society based on personal 
moral integrity, and if it is safe-guarded by the condit-
ions discussed above (especially, nonviolence and self-
suffering), then there is hope that it will be seen as 
a politically acceptable and morally laudable means for 
solving conflicts in society, For when laws fail (either 
in their execution, interpretation, or formulation) to 
serve the people, then some tool besides violent conflict 
is needed. And what better tool than one which demands 
individual reflection on moral values, group co-operation, 
and the formulation of socially concerned consciences. 
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